Using a straightforward rational-choice approach, Professor
Ramseyerexplores the impact that law had on various markets in
Japanese historyand the effect that those markets had on economic
growth. In doing so,he applies an economic logic to markets in a
different world in a differenthistorical period with a different
political regime and a different legalsystem. He looks hardest at
those markets that have most often strucktraditional observers as
"exploitative" e.g., the markets for indenturedservants and for
sexual services. Within those markets, he focuses on theway
participants handled informational asymmetries in the
contractingprocess.
Ramseyer finds that Japanese courts generally defined
important prop-erty rights clearly, and that Japanese markets
generally protected an indi-vidual''s control over his or her own
labor. As a result, that the Japaneseeconomy grew at relatively
efficient levels follows directly from standardeconomic theory. He
also concludes that the legal system usually pro-moted mutually
advantageous deals, and that market participantswhether poor or
rich, female or male generally mitigated informationalasymmetries
shrewdly by contract. He finds no systematic evidence ofeither sex-
or age-based exploitation.
目錄：
List of tables
Series editors" preface
Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION
1 Historical context
2 Property rights and Japanese studies
3 This project
3.1 Coverage
3.2 Caveats
3.3 Selection criteria
4 Law economics and history
CHAPTER I
LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Introduction
The property rights paradigm
Law and efficient growth in Japan
Why relatively efficient law?
3.1 General theories
3.2 Federalism in Tokugawa Japan
3.3 Legal efficiency in imperial Japan
Conclusion
……
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